The New Atlantic Disorder, Part II: The Caribbean Visa Calculus—Why Trump's Restrictions Spare the Strategic Three
Selective Punishment in the Caribbean
In Part I, we examined how Trump's Greenland tariff threats and Canada's embrace of China are fracturing the Atlantic alliance. But a closer look at Trump's immigration policy reveals an even more calculated pattern of coercion—one that exposes the transactional logic now driving U.S. foreign policy.
On January 14, 2026, the Trump administration announced an indefinite suspension of immigrant visa processing for 75 countries, citing concerns about "public charge"—the risk that immigrants will depend on welfare and public benefits. The suspension, effective January 21, includes almost all CARICOM nations:
• Antigua and Barbuda
• The Bahamas
• Barbados
• Belize
• Dominica
• Grenada
• Haiti
• Jamaica
• Saint Kitts and Nevis
• Saint Lucia
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Yet three English-speaking Caribbean nations are conspicuously absent from the list:
• Trinidad and Tobago
• Guyana
• Suriname
The question is not whether this omission is deliberate—it obviously is. The question is why. And the answer reveals how Trump is using immigration policy as a tool of geopolitical leverage, rewarding compliance and punishing dissent in a region Washington has long considered its "backyard."
The Official Justification: "Public Charge" and Welfare Dependency
The Trump administration's stated rationale for the visa suspensions is straightforward: prevent immigrants who are likely to become dependent on U.S. public assistance programs from entering the country.
State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott framed it as ending "the abuse of America's immigration system by those who would extract wealth from the American people."
But the data tells a different story.
The Problem with the Public Charge Argument
Studies consistently show that immigrants—including those from the Caribbean—use public benefits at lower rates than native-born Americans. Moreover, the State Department's own data on welfare usage rates shows no meaningful difference between Caribbean countries that were sanctioned and those that were exempted.
In fact, the Dominican Republic—which was also exempted from the visa suspension—has higher rates of public assistance usage among its immigrant population than several countries on the sanctioned list.
CARICOM Chairman and St. Kitts Prime Minister Terrance Drew dismissed the public charge justification outright: "This is not really so. The list includes all of the OECS and most of CARICOM, except for Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago."
If welfare dependency were the real concern, the exemptions make no statistical sense. Which means we need to look elsewhere for the real reasons.
The Real Reasons: Strategic Alignment on Venezuela and U.S. Interests
The exemption of Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname is not about welfare statistics—it's about geopolitical alignment, particularly regarding Venezuela.
All three exempted countries share critical characteristics:
A. Guyana: Defense Agreements and Anti-Venezuela Solidarity
Guyana has signed formal defense agreements with Washington and has been the most vocal Caribbean supporter of U.S. policy toward Venezuela. The country faces an ongoing territorial dispute with Venezuela over the oil-rich Essequibo region, and has actively welcomed U.S. military and diplomatic support.
Key factors:
• Defense Cooperation: Guyana has formalized military cooperation with the United States, including joint exercises and intelligence sharing.
• Venezuela Tensions: Guyana's border dispute with Venezuela makes it a natural U.S. ally in containing Maduro's government.
• Oil Investment: ExxonMobil's massive offshore oil discoveries in Guyana (estimated at over 11 billion barrels) have made the country strategically vital to U.S. energy interests.
Washington sees Guyana as a frontline state in its effort to isolate and pressure Venezuela. Punishing Guyanese immigrants with visa restrictions would contradict that strategic priority.
B. Trinidad and Tobago: Energy, Geography, and Political Alignment
Trinidad and Tobago—the wealthiest and most industrialized Caribbean nation—has been described as America's "aircraft carrier" in the Caribbean due to its strategic location just off Venezuela's coast.
Key factors:
• Energy Resources: Trinidad is the largest oil and gas producer in the Caribbean, with deep economic ties to U.S. energy markets. U.S. companies have significant investments in Trinidad's energy sector.
• Geographic Proximity to Venezuela: Trinidad sits less than 10 miles from Venezuela's Paria Peninsula, making it a critical intelligence and logistics hub for U.S. operations aimed at monitoring or pressuring Caracas.
• Political Support: Under certain administrations, Trinidad has been openly supportive of Trump's Venezuela policy, avoiding the more critical stance taken by other CARICOM members.
Punishing Trinidad would risk alienating a key regional partner that provides both energy security and geographic leverage.
C. Suriname: Oil Investment and Future Strategic Value
Suriname is the newest player in the Caribbean oil boom, with major offshore discoveries by TotalEnergies and Apache Corporation in recent years.
Key factors:
• Oil Potential: Suriname's offshore reserves could rival Guyana's, making it a priority for U.S. energy companies seeking to diversify away from OPEC sources.
• Openness to Investment: Suriname has actively courted U.S. and Western oil investment, signaling alignment with Washington's economic interests.
• Venezuela Neutrality/Support: While less vocal than Guyana, Suriname has not joined regional criticism of U.S. Venezuela policy.
Washington is betting on Suriname as a future energy partner and sees visa restrictions as counterproductive to cultivating that relationship.
The Venezuela Factor: Rewarding Compliance, Punishing Independence
The pattern is unmistakable: countries that support or remain neutral on U.S. policy toward Venezuela are rewarded; those that resist or criticize it are punished.
Venezuela as the Litmus Test
The Trump administration has made regime change in Venezuela a core foreign policy objective. In this context:
• Guyana is a U.S. ally because it opposes Maduro and welcomes U.S. military presence.
• Trinidad provides strategic geography and has avoided regional solidarity with Venezuela.
• Suriname is courting U.S. investment and has not joined pro-Maduro voices.
Meanwhile, countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Vincent—which have maintained diplomatic relations with Venezuela and criticized U.S. interventionism—find themselves on the sanctioned list.
The message is clear: alignment with U.S. policy in Latin America determines your access to the United States.
This is not immigration policy—it is coercion disguised as border security.
The Citizenship by Investment (CBI) Dimension
Another factor complicating visa restrictions is the prevalence of Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) programs in the Eastern Caribbean.
Five Caribbean CBI jurisdictions are on the visa suspension list:
• Antigua and Barbuda
• Dominica
• Grenada
• Saint Kitts and Nevis
• Saint Lucia
The Trump administration has explicitly cited these programs as security concerns, arguing that they allow wealthy foreign nationals—including from China, Russia, and the Middle East—to acquire Caribbean passports and potentially gain easier access to the United States.
While CBI programs are a legitimate concern for U.S. immigration officials, they don't explain why:
• Grenada was initially exempted from earlier travel bans (due to its E-2 treaty status) but is now included.
• Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname—none of which operate CBI programs—are exempted alongside non-CBI countries with similar welfare usage rates.
The CBI issue is real, but it's being used selectively to justify broader geopolitical punishment.
What This Means for CARICOM: Dividing the Region
The selective visa restrictions expose and exacerbate existing fractures within CARICOM.
CARICOM's Fragile Solidarity
CARICOM has long struggled to maintain unity on foreign policy issues, particularly when member states have divergent economic interests. The visa exemptions amplify these tensions:
• Energy-Rich vs. Service Economies: Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname—all energy producers—benefit from U.S. favour, while tourism-dependent island nations face punishment.
• Geographic Divides: The three exempted countries are all on the South American mainland, while sanctioned countries are primarily islands. This reinforces a perception that Washington values continental partners over small island states.
• Venezuela Policy Splits: Countries that maintain ties with Venezuela (Antigua, Dominica, Saint Vincent) are punished, while those aligned with U.S. regime change goals are rewarded.
The Trump administration is effectively weaponizing immigration policy to divide CARICOM, rewarding compliance and isolating dissenters.
Diplomatic Scramble
As of the time of writing, six Caribbean nations have signed or are finalizing non-binding memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the United States to potentially accept asylum-seekers deported from the U.S. who cannot be returned to their countries of origin. As of January 2026, these nations are Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guyana, and—in advanced discussions—Grenada.
Most islands now have a formalized, non-binding MOU that explicitly emphasizes "no legal obligation" and "maximum caps", and in the case of St. Lucia, "establishes a framework for cooperation and does not trigger any immediate transfer or future engagements," and that the government "retains full authority to determine if, when, and how any engagement under the framework would occur."
However, Guyana is in advanced stages of finalizing an agreement and has taken a distinctive approach by emphasizing labour-market benefits. According to government statements, Guyana seeks to accept "skilled migrants" without legal U.S. status—specifically professionals such as doctors, engineers, and construction workers—to address documented labour shortages. This framing positions the arrangement as potentially benefiting Guyana's labor market rather than simply accommodating U.S. deportation priorities.
Broader Implications: Immigration as Geopolitical Weapon
The Caribbean visa calculus is not an isolated incident—it reflects a broader shift in how Trump uses immigration policy as a tool of statecraft.
From Greenland to the Caribbean: A Pattern of Coercion
In Part I, we examined how Trump threatened to impose tariffs on countries that don't support his plan to annex Greenland. The Caribbean visa restrictions follow the same logic:
1. Identify a U.S. strategic objective (Greenland acquisition, Venezuela regime change).
2. Threaten economic or immigration penalties against non-compliant nations.
3. Reward allies and punish dissenters, regardless of stated policy rationales.
This is not governance—it's extortion.
The Precedent for Other Regions
If Trump can use visa restrictions to coerce Caribbean nations into supporting his Venezuela policy, what's to stop him from applying the same tactics elsewhere?
• African countries that refuse to support U.S. positions on China or Russia?
• Southeast Asian nations that maintain trade ties with Beijing?
• Middle Eastern states that won't align with U.S. Iran policy?
The Caribbean is a test case. If Washington succeeds in fragmenting CARICOM and punishing dissent without significant blowback, expect similar tactics to spread globally.
Conclusion: The Fracturing Continues
The Caribbean visa restrictions are not a footnote to Trump's foreign policy—like tariffs, they are a microcosm of how the U.S. empire now operates, while in decline.
Key Takeaways:
1. Policy Pretexts Are Meaningless: The "public charge" justification for visa restrictions is statistically baseless. The real criteria are geopolitical alignment and access to resources.
2. Immigration Is Now a Weapon: Just as Trump uses tariffs to coerce Greenland acceptance (Part I), he uses visa policy to enforce compliance on Venezuela, defense cooperation, and energy deals.
3. Transactional Alliances Replace Ideological Solidarity: Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname are rewarded not because their immigrants are more "self-sufficient," but because they provide oil, military bases, and support for U.S. regional objectives.
4. Small States Have No Leverage: Caribbean nations are forced into humiliating deals—accepting deported asylum-seekers, signing defense agreements, abandoning Venezuela solidarity—just to restore visa access that should never have been threatened in the first place.
5. The Caribbean as Template: If this works in CARICOM, expect it everywhere. Trump has shown that immigration policy can fragment regional blocs, reward compliant autocrats, and punish independent democracies—all while claiming to protect American workers.
The Bigger Picture: A Declining Hegemon's Toolkit
In Part I, we examined how Trump's threats over Greenland and Canada's China pivot signal the fracturing of the Atlantic alliance. The Caribbean visa restrictions confirm the pattern:
• The United States no longer leads through shared values or mutual benefit.
• It coerces through tariffs, visa bans, and threats of abandonment.
• Allies hedge (Canada pivots to China), adversaries consolidate (Russia-China-Iran), and small states scramble to avoid being crushed.
This is not the behaviour of a confident superpower. It is the behavior of an empire in decline—desperate, transactional, and increasingly willing to burn alliances for short-term leverage.
And when the hegemon turns predator, even the smallest nations start looking for exits.

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