Trinidad & Tobago as America's "Aircraft Carrier": Who's Really Behind the New Monroe Doctrine?

Understanding the institutional forces reshaping Caribbean geopolitics 

When Venezuela's government accused Trinidad & Tobago of becoming a "U.S. aircraft carrier," it wasn't mere rhetoric. In December 2025, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar granted the United States military expanded access to the nation's airports, radar installations, and strategic infrastructure. This decision—made just miles from Venezuela's coast—marks a watershed moment for Caribbean sovereignty and regional unity. 

But here's the question that should concern every Caribbean citizen: Who is actually architecting this strategy? Donald Trump may sign the orders and deliver the bombastic rhetoric about "blasting the hell out of countries," but he is not the strategic mind behind this revival of 19th-century American imperialism. The Trump administration's Caribbean policy—formally enshrined in the December 2025 National Security Strategy as the "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine—represents the convergence of institutional forces that have been developing this blueprint for decades. 

The Real Architects of Hemispheric Dominance -  Marco Rubio: The Ideological Driver 

Florida Senator Marco Rubio, now Secretary of State, has been described as "Secretary of State for Latin America" since Trump's first term. His personal hostility toward Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua isn't just political posturing—it's the engine driving current policy. Rubio personally designated 10 drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, negotiated deals to send deportees to El Salvador's notorious prisons, and has openly stated that "the road to Havana runs through Venezuela." When his State Department spokesman articulated the mission—"eliminating the cartels, ending illegal mass migration and pushing out China's exploitative practices"—he revealed a comprehensive agenda that extends far beyond counternarcotics. 

Dr. Evan Ellis: The Scholar Shaping the Narrative 

Perhaps the most crucial name you've never heard is Dr. R. Evan Ellis, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and senior associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ellis has testified before Congress multiple times, and his scholarship provides the intellectual foundation for viewing China's presence in the Caribbean as an existential threat. His research documents China's control of one-third of deep-water ports in Latin America and the Caribbean, smart city initiatives in seven countries, and the expansion of digital infrastructure that poses intelligence vulnerabilities. Ellis warns that Chinese dominance leaves "the West out, and Latin Americans serving as mid-level managers" in Chinese-owned operations. This academic framing transforms economic competition into security imperatives, thereby justifying a military buildup. 

U.S. Southern Command: The Institutional Machinery Based in Doral, Florida, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been developing partnership frameworks across the Caribbean since at least 2018. Under Admiral Alvin Holsey's brief leadership, SOUTHCOM expanded from approximately 3,500 personnel to nearly 15,000 supporting regional operations. But here's where it gets revealing: Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth reportedly forced Holsey into early retirement in December 2025—two years ahead of schedule—because the Admiral raised concerns about the legality of strikes on suspected drug vessels and wasn't moving fast enough on strategies regarding the Panama Canal. When military professionals question the legality of operations, they're removed. This tells us everything about who's actually in control. 

Defence Contractors: The Economic Beneficiaries 

Follow the money. General Atomics received a $14.1 billion contract for MQ-9 Reaper drone systems in mid-September 2025, positioning it to benefit significantly from operations in the Caribbean. The "Big Five" defence contractors (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, RTX/Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics) stand to benefit enormously from what experts fear might be a "larger, longer operation in the region." The unprecedented military buildup includes the USS Gerald R. Ford (the world's largest aircraft carrier), F-35 fighter jets, attack submarines armed with Tomahawk missiles, and approximately 15,000 military personnel deployed in the Caribbean. 

What This Means for Trinidad & Tobago 

Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar's decision to align with the U.S. reflects classic realist calculations: to address a domestic crime crisis (over 620 homicides in 2024) and to potentially recoup Caribbean energy markets lost to Venezuela's Petrocaribe initiative. The benefits are tangible—radar systems, military training, infrastructure improvements, and interdiction support. But the costs are mounting: Economic Retaliation: Venezuela immediately cancelled all gas agreements with Trinidad & Tobago following the December military access decision, thereby terminating contracts critical to an economy in which oil and gas account for 40% of GDP and 80% of exports. Regional Isolation: Former Jamaican ambassador Curtis Ward stated that Trinidad & Tobago's actions would "shatter" the Caribbean's traditional Zone of Peace principle. The island nation has departed from CARICOM's post-colonial consensus on non-alignment. Sovereignty Questions: The extent of U.S. military infrastructure—radar installations, fuel storage facilities reportedly near airports, and now expanded airport access—raises fundamental questions about genuine autonomy. Proximity to Conflict: If U.S. operations escalate to regime change in Venezuela, Trinidad & Tobago sits just miles from the potential conflict zone. 

The Fracturing of CARICOM 

The broader Caribbean faces an impossible choice. The post-colonial consensus around non-alignment and regional solidarity is collapsing under the weight of: 

• Domestic crime crises fueled by drug trafficking 

• Economic vulnerability after Petrocaribe's decline 

• Climate threats requiring massive infrastructure investment 

• Chinese offers of development financing with strings attached 

• U.S. pressure to choose sides in great power competition. 

Small island nations with limited sovereignty face few viable options. The Trump administration—guided by Rubio, Ellis, SOUTHCOM strategists, and defence industry interests—is systematically leveraging that vulnerability. 

The Longer Game 

The 2025 National Security Strategy emphasizes reasserting American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and denying non-hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or influence in the region. The strategy calls for: 

• "Establishing or expanding access in strategically important locations." 

• Targeted deployments with "lethal force where necessary." 

• Pushing out foreign companies that build regional infrastructure. 

• Securing "sole-source contracts for U.S. companies." 

• Using leverage over dependent countries to resist policies that "disadvantage U.S. businesses." 

This isn't about stopping drug trafficking. It's about creating a network of forward operating locations—like Trinidad & Tobago—that provide ports, airports, radar coverage, and fuel infrastructure without the political complications of formal military bases. It's about systematically excluding Chinese and Russian influence while reasserting U.S. dominance not seen since the Cold War. It's about establishing the infrastructure and bilateral relationships that will allow the U.S. to project power throughout the Caribbean and Latin America for decades to come. 

The Question for Caribbean Leaders 

For Prime Ministers across CARICOM, the Trinidad & Tobago model presents a test case: align with U.S. security interests and receive tangible benefits, or maintain regional solidarity and risk isolation from Western support. But here's what should give pause: the architects of this strategy—Rubio, Ellis, SOUTHCOM planners, defence contractors—are not primarily concerned with Caribbean prosperity or sovereignty. They're executing a comprehensive plan to restore American preeminence in what they view as the U.S. "backyard." Trinidad & Tobago may calculate that alignment serves its immediate interests. But at what point does hosting foreign military infrastructure, losing energy partnerships with neighbours, and fracturing regional unity become too high a price to pay? 

And for the rest of the Caribbean: when small nations become pieces on a chessboard of great power competition, who actually wins? The "aircraft carrier" metaphor may be Venezuelan hyperbole, but it captures an uncomfortable truth—when your sovereignty depends on which great power you align with, you've already lost something fundamental. The deeper question isn't whether Trinidad & Tobago made the right choice. The question is whether small Caribbean nations should ever face such a choice in the first place.